This is a list of the recommended readings for the University of Edinburgh Online School of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences, organized under classes offered.

http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/phil_students/postgraduate/online_msc_in_epistemology_ethics_and_mind.php

I omitted the ethics classes because I don't like ethics and this is my party and I do what I want.

+ Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science

Week 1: Person and Sub-person levels of explanation
X D.C. Dennett “Personal and sub-personal levels of explanation.” reprinted in J. Bermudez (Ed) Philosophy of Psychology: contemporary readings (Routledge 2006). Available as an Ebook.
Secondary:
X J.L. Bermudez Philosophy of Psychology: a contemporary introduction, ch.2 (Routledge, 2005)
X D. Davidson “Psychology as Philosophy” In Bermudez (Ed)
O M. Tsarkiris & P. Haggard (2011). Neural, functional and phenomenological signatures of intentional action. In F. Grammont, D. Legrand, and P. Livet (Eds.) Naturalizing Intention in Action. MIT. Press.
O R. Van Gulick (2009). Functionalism. In B. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann & S. Walter (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (128 - 151) Oxford University Press

Week 2: Non-reductive materialism
X L. Anthony (2007) Everybody has got it: a defence of non-reductive materialism. In B. McLaughlin & J. Cohen (Eds.) Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. (160 – 181) Blackwells.
Secondary:
O L. Rudder-Baker (2009). Non-Reductive materialism. In B. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann & S. Walter (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (109 – 127) Oxford University Press.
O T. Crane (2001). Elements of Mind. (sections 9-17) Oxford University Press.
X J. Fodor (1990). Making mind matter more. In his A Theory of Content and Other Essays. (137 – 160) Bradford Books.
X S. Stich (1983). Will the Concepts of Folk Psychology Find a Place in Cognitive Science? in his book From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief, (210-19) MIT Press.

Week 3: Eliminative materialism
X Paul Churchland, (1981) Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, 78, 67 – 90
Secondary:
• P. Churchland (2007) The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism. In B. Mclaughlin & J. Cohen (Eds.) Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. (160 – 181) Blackwells. Highly recommended as a supplementary reading for this week.
• P. Churchland (1979) Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge University Press. Ch.4.
• T. Horgan and J. Woodward (1985) Folk Psychology is here to stay. Philosophical Review, 94, 197 – 226
• D. Lewis (1972) Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. Australisian Journal of Philosophy, 50, 249 – 258 (pp.248 – 253 are the most relevant).

Week 4: Mechanistic Explanation in Psychology
X P. Machamer, L. Darden & C. Craver “Thinking about mechanisms.” Philosophy of Science, 67 (2000), 1-25.
Secondary:
• R. Cummins “‘How does it work?’ versus ‘What are the laws?’: Two conceptions of psychological explanation.” Reprinted in Bermudez (Ed.) Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Readings. Routledge, 2006.
• R. Cummins, “Functional Analysis” Journal of Philosophy 1975
• J. Bermudez Philosophy of Psychology: a contemporary introduction, ch.3 (Routledge, 2005)
• D. Lewis “Reduction of Mind.” reprinted in Bermudez & Macpherson (Ed’s)
• C. Wright & W. Bechtel “Mechanisms and psychological explanation” In P. Thagard (Ed) Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science.

Week 5: The Language of Thought Hypothesis
• Fodor, J. (1987). Mental Representation: an introduction. In N. Rescher, Scientific Enquiry in Philosophical Perspective (pp. 105 - 128). University Press of America.
• Fodor, J. (1987). Psychosemantics. (Appendix). MIT Press
Secondary:
• Ayede, M. (2004). The language of thought hypothesis, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Online.
• Clark, A. (2001). Mindware: an introduction to Philosophy of Cognitive Science . Oxford University Press. ch.1 & 2
• Crane, T. (1995/2003). The Mechanical Mind (2nd Edition ed.). Routledge. pp. 8 - 20
• Cummins, R. (1989). Meaning and Mental Representation. M.I.T. Press. pp. 1 – 26
• Dennet, D. (1977). A cure for the common code. Reprinted in Brainstorms, ch.6. (1978) MIT Press.

Week 6: Tacit knowledge and theories in cognitive processes
• Fodor, J. (1968) The appeal to tacit knowledge in psychological explanation. The Journal of Philosophy, 65 627 – 640.
Secondary:
• Stich, S. (1978). Beliefs and subdoxastic states. Philosophy of Science, 45, 499 - 518
• Cummins, R. (1978) Programs in the explanation of behaviour. Philosophy of Science, 44. 269 – 287.
• Davies, M. & Stone, T. (2001) Mental Simulation, tacit theory, and the threat of collapse. Philosophical topics 127–173. [Section 4 is most salient; obviously if you’d like to write on this topic, you should read the whole thing at some point].
• Manfredi, P. (1993). Tacit beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. Philosophia, pp. 95-117.
• Nisbett, R. & Wilson, T. (1977) “Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes”. Psychological Review, 84.3, pp. 231-59.
• Quine, W.V.O. (1972). Methodological reflections on current linguistic theory. In D. Davidson and G. Harman (Eds). Semantics of Natural Language. 442 – 454.
• Searle, J. (1992). The Unconscious and Its Relation to Consciousness. From his The Rediscovery of the Mind, pp. 151-73 (MIT Press).
• Stich, S. & Ravenscroft, I. (1999). What is folk psychology? Cognition, 50, 447 – 468.

Week 7: The extended mind hypothesis
• Clark & D. Chalmers (1998) The Extended Mind. Analysis 58 . 10-23:
• Mark Sprevak (2009) “Extended Cognition and Functionalism.” Journal of Philosophy 106. 503-27
Secondary:
• Adams, F. And Aizawa, K. (2008). The Bounds of Cognition. Blackwell.
• Adams, F. And Aizawa, K. (2010). Defending the bounds of cognition. Available here: https://mywebspace.wisc.edu/lshapiro/web/Phil554_files/A%26ADefending.pdf.
• Clark, A. (2011). Supersizing the Mind. O.U.P.
• Rowlands, M. (2009). Extended Cognition and the mark of the cognitive. Philosophical Psychology, 22, pp. 1 - 19
• Rupert, R. (2004). Challenges to the hypothesis of the extended mind. Journal of Philosophy, 101, pp.389 – 428.
• Shapiro, L. (2011). Embodied Cognition. Ch. 3 & 6. Routledge

Week 8: The modular mind
• Carruthers, P. (2004). The mind is a system of modules shaped by natural selection. In C. Hitchcock (Ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science (pp. 293 – 311). Blackwell.
• Cowie, F., & Woodward, J. (2004). The mind is not (just) a system of modules shaped (just) by natural selection. In C. Hitchcock (Ed.). Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science (pp. 312 - 334). Blackwell.
Secondary:
• Buller, D. & Hardcastle, V. “Evolutionary psychology, Meet Developmental Neurobiology: Against Promiscuous Modularity” Brain and Mind 1: 307-25
• Carruthers, P. (2006). Simple heuristics meet massive modularity. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence and S. Stich (Eds.), The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition.
• Fodor, J. (1983). Precis of ‘The Modularity of Mind’. Brain and Behavioural Sciences 8, 1 - 5
• Samuels, R. (1998). Evolutionary psychology and the massive modularity hypothesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 49, 575-602.
• Sterelny, K. (2003). Thought in a Hostile World. (ch.10) Blackwell.

Week 9: The embodied mind
• Shapiro, L. (2011) Embodied Cognition. (Chapters 2 & 3) Routledge.
Secondary:
• Anderson, M. (2003) “Embodied cognition: a field guide” In Artificial Intelligence, 149, 91-130.
• Barsalou, L.W. (2008) Grounded Cognition. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 59, 617-45
• Boroditsky, L & Prinz, J. (2007) What thoughts are made of.
• Haugeland, J. (1998) Mind Embodied and Embedded. In Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind. (207 – 240) Harvard University Press.
• Pfeifer, R. & Scheier, C. (1999) Understanding intelligence (parts II and III) MIT Press.
• Wilson, M. (2002) “Six views of embodied cognition” In Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 9.4: 625-36

Week 10: Against the computational mind
X Van Gelder, T. (1995) What might cognition be if not computation? Journal of Philosophy 92, 345-81
• Grush, R. (2003) In Defence of Some Cartesian Assumptions Concerning the Brain and its Operations Biology and Philosophy 18, 53 – 93
Secondary:
• Brooks, R. (1991) Intelligence without representation. Artificial Intelligence, 47, 139 – 159
• Calvo Garzón, F. (2008) Towards a general theory of antirepresentationalism. British Journal of Philosophy of Science, 59, 259 – 292
• Chomsky, N. (1959) Review of ‘Verbal Behaviour.’ Language, 35, 26 – 58.
• Clark, A. & Toribio, J. (1994) Doing without representing? Synthese, 101, 401-431
• Gallagher, S. (2008) “Are Minimal Representations Still Representations. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 351-69
• Wheeler, M. (2008) Minimal Representing: A response to Gallagher. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 16, 371-76

+ Advanced Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science

Week 1: Folk psychology
• Stich, S. & Ravenscroft, I. (1994). What is folk psychology? Cognition, 50, 447 – 468.
• Churchland, P. (1981). “Eliminative Materialism & Propositional Attitudes” Journal of Philosophy, 78.2, pp. 67-90.
• Horgan, T. & Woodward, J. (1985). “Folk Psychology is Here to Stay” Philosophical Review, 94.2, pp. 197-226.
• Lewis, D. (1972). Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 50, 249 - 258. (read pp. 248 – 253). Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2003). Mindreading.(ch.2). Oxford University Press.
• Putnam, H. (1967) ‘The Nature of Mental States,’ in H. Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical papers vol. 2 (pp. 429-440), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Week 2: Can animals think?
• Carruthers, P. (2004). On being simple minded. American Philosophical Quarterly. 41, 205-220
• Davidson, D. (1982/2001). Rational Animals. In Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford University Press. Ch.7. Available as an Ebook.
Secondary:
• Allen, C. & Beckoff, M. (1997). Species of Mind: The philosophy and biology of cognitive ethology Cambridge, MIT Press. Ch. 5 and 6. (All chapters are relevant, so look at the beginning ones too if you’d like to write on this topic).
• Brannon, E. & Terrace, H.S. (2004). The evolution and ontogeny of ordinal numerical ability. M. Bekoff et al. (eds.) The Cognitive Animal. MIT Press.
• Clayton, N., Bussey, T., & Dickinson, A. (2003). Can Animals Recall the Past and Plan for the Future? Nature Reviews Neuroscience. 4, 685 – 691.
• Davidson, D. (2001) What Thought Requires. In Problems of Rationality, Ch. 9. Available as an Ebook.
• Fitzpatrick, S. (2009). The primate mindreading controversy: a case study in simplicity and methodology in animal psychology. In R. Lurz (Ed.), The philosophy of animal minds (pp. 224 - 246). Cambridge University Press.
• Giurfa, M., Zhang, S., Jenett, A., Menzel, R., & Srinivasan, M. (2001). The concepts of 'sameness' and 'difference' in an insect. Nature. 410, 930-933.
• Heyes, C. (1998). Theory of mind in non-human primates [and peer commentaries]. Brain and Behavioural Sciences. 21, 101 – 148
• Hurley, S. L., & Nudds, M. (2006). The Questions of Animal Rationality: Theory and Evidence. In S. L. Hurley, & M. Nudds (Eds.), Rational Animals?. (pp. 1 - 83). Oxford University Press.
• Povinelli, D., & Vonk, J. (2004). We don’t need a microscope to explore to chimpanzee’s mind. Mind and Language, 19, 1 – 28.

Week 3: Theory-theory
• Gopnik, A., & Wellman, H. (1992). Why the child's theory of mind really is a theory. Mind and Language, 7, 145-71, sections 1-3
• Wellman, H. (2014). Making Minds. OUP. Ch.6
Secondary:
• Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness: an essay on autism and theory of mind. MIT Press.
• Botterill, G. (1996). Folk psychology and theoretical status. In P. Carruthers, & P. Smith (Eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. pp. 105-119. Cambridge University Press.
• Botterill, G. & Carruthers, P. (1999). The Philosophy of Psychology. Ch.1, 2 & 4
• Carruthers, P. (2009). How we know our own minds: the relationship between mindreading and metacognition. Behavioural and Brain Sciences , 32, 121 – 182
• Carruthers, P. & Smith, P. (1996). Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press. (All articles relevant for this and next week, especially parts 1 and 2).
• Gopnik, A. (1996). The scientist as child. Philosophy of science, 63, 485 - 514.
• Gopnik, A. & Wellman, H. (2012). Reconstructing constructivism: causal models, Bayesian learning mechanisms, and the theory-theory. Psychological Bulletin, 138, 1085 - 1108
• Lewis, D. (1972). Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 50, 249 - 258. (pp. 248 – 253 are the most important).
• Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2003). Mindreading. Oxford University Press. Ch. 2.
• Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 1, 515 - 26.
• Stich, S. & Ravenscroft, I. (1994). What is folk psychology? Cognition, 50, 447 – 468.
• Sober, E. (2000). Evolution and the problem of other minds. Journal of Philosophy, 97, 365 – 386.
• Wellman, H. (1992). A Child’s Theory of Mind. MIT Press. Ch. 1 & 4. Available as an Ebook.
• Wimmer, H. & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understand of deception. Cognition, 13, 103 - 128

Week 4: Simulation theory
• Goldman, A. (2006). Simulating Minds. Oxford University Press. Ch. 2. Available as an E-book
• Saxe, R. (2005). Against Simulation: the argument from error. Trends in Cognitive Science, 9, 174 - 179
Secondary:
• Davies, M., & Stone, T. (1998). Folk psychology and mental simulation. In A. O'Hear (Ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind (pp. 53-82). Cambridge University Press.
• Gallese, V., & Goldman, A. (1998). Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mindreading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences , 2, 493-501.
• Goldman, A. (1989). Interpretation Psychologized. Mind and Language , 4, 161 - 185.
• Heal, J. (1986). Replication and Functionalism. In J. Butterfield (Ed.), Language, Mind and Logic (pp. 135 - 150). Cambridge University Press.
• Saxe, R. (2005). Against Simulation: the argument from error. Trends in Cognitive Science, 9, 174 - 179
• Stich, S., & Nichols, S. (1993). Folk psychology: Simulation or tacit theory? Philosophical Issues, 3, 225

Week 5: Mirror neurons and the direct perception of mental states
• Gallese, V. (2002). Before and below ‘theory of mind’: embodied simulation and the neural correlates of social cognition. Philosophical transactions of the royal society of the biological sciences, 362, 659 - 669
• Spaulding, S. (2013) Mirror neurons and social cognition. Mind & Language 28, 233-257. (read this after the Gallese reading).
Secondary:
• Calvo-Merino, B., Glaser, D., Grèzes, J., Passingham, R., & Haggard, P. (2005). Action observation and acquired motor skills: an FMRI study with expert dancers. Cerebral Cortex , 15, 1243-1249.
• Csibra, G. (2005, January 2). Mirror neurons and action observation. Is simulation involved? Retrieved from http://www.interdisciplines.org/mirror/ [http://www.cbcd.bbk.ac.uk/people/scientificstaff/gergo/pub/index.html/pub/mirror.pdf]
• Csibra, G. (2007). Action mirroring and action understanding: an alternative account. In P. Haggard, Y. Rosetti, & M. Kawato (Eds.), Sensorimotor foundations of higher cognition: attention and performance XXII (pp. 435 - 459). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (read this after the Gallese paper)
• Gallagher, S. (2001). The practice of mind: theory, simulation or primary interaction? Journal of Consciousness Studies , 8, 83-108.
• Gallagher, S. (2007). Simulation trouble. Social Neuroscience , 2, 353 - 365.
• Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2008). The Phenomenological Mind. Routledge. Ch. 9.
• Gallese, V. (2009). Motor abstraction: a neuroscientific account of how action goals and intentions are mapped and understood. Psychological Research , 73, 486 – 498
• Jacob, P. (2008). What do mirror neurons contribute to human social cognition? Mind and Language, 23, 190 - 223.
• Lavelle, J. S. (2012). Theory-theory and the direct perception of mental states. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 3, 213 - 230
• Reddy, V. (2008). How Infants Know Minds. Harvard University Press. Ch. 2.

Week 6: Can infants mindread?
• Butterfill, S. & Apperly, I. (2011). How to construct a minimal theory of mind. Mind and Language, 28, 606 – 637
• Carruthers, P. (2015) Mindreading in adults: Evaluating two-systems views. Synthese forthcoming 1-16.
Secondary:
• Apperly, I. & Butterfill, S. (2009) Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states? Psychological Review, 116, pp.953 - 970
• Baillargeon, R., Scott, R., & He, Z. (2010). False belief understanding in infants. Trends in Cognitive Sciences , 14, 110 - 118.
• Barrett, H., Broesch, T., Scott, R., He, Z., Baillargeon, R., Wu, D., et al. (2013). Early false-belief understanding in traditional non-Western societies. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 280, 1-5.
• Carruthers, P. (2013). Mindreading in infancy. Mind & Language 28, 141-172.
• Csibra, G., & Southgate, V. (2006). Evidence for infants' understanding of false beliefs should not be dismissed. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 4-5.
• Gergely, G., Bekkering, H., & Király, I. (2002). Rational imitation in preverbal infants. Nature , 415, 755.
• Heyes, C. (2014). False belief in infancy: a fresh look. Developmental science, 17(5), 647-659.
• Scott, R. M., & Baillargeon, R. (2014). How fresh a look? A reply to Heyes. Developmental science, 17(5), 660-664.
• Southgate, V., & Vernetti, A. (2014). Belief-based action prediction in preverbal infants. Cognition, 130, 1-10.

Week 7: The nativism/empiricism debate
• Chomsky, N. (1967). Recent contributions to the theory of innate ideas. Synthese, 17, 2-11.
• Samuels, R. (2002). Nativism in cognitive science. Mind and Language, 17, 233 - 265
Secondary:
• Cowie, F. (1998). What's Within? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Part III, especially chapters 8 and 9.
• Crain, S. and Pietroski, P. (2001). Nature, Nurture and Universal Grammar. Linguistics and Philosophy, 24, 139-185.
• Fitzpatrick, S. Nativism, Empiricism, and Ockham’s Razor. Erkenntnis, 1-28.
• Griffiths, P. (2002). What is Innateness? Monist, 85, 70-85.
• Griffiths, P. E., and Machery, E. (2008). Innateness, canalisation and 'biologicizing the mind'. Philosophical Psychology, 21(3), 397-414
• Laurence, S., and Margolis, E. (2001). The poverty of the stimulus argument. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 52, 217-276.
• Putnam, H. (1967). The ‘Innateness Hypothesis’ and explanatory models in linguistics. Synthese 17,12-22.
• Samuels, R. (2007). Is innateness a confused concept? In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence and S. Stich (Eds.), The Innate Mind volume 3: Foundations and the Future. (pp. 17 – 36). Oxford University Press.
• Stich, S. (1975). Introduction. In S. Stich (Ed.) Innate Ideas. University of California Press.

Week 8: Evolutionary Psychology
• Carruthers, P. (2004). The mind is a system of modules shaped by natural selection. In C. Hitchcock (Ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science (pp. 293 – 311). Blackwell.
• Cowie, F., & Woodward, J. (2004). The mind is not (just) a system of modules shaped (just) by natural selection. In C. Hitchcock (Ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science (pp. 312 - 334). Blackwell
Secondary:
• Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, vol. 11 has a series of short articles on the evolutionary psychology debate, beginning with Cosmides et. al. ‘Detecting Cheaters’ pp.505-506
• Barrett, H. (2005). Enzymatic computation and cognitive modularity. Mind and Language, 20, 259 - 287.
• Buller, D. (2005). Adapting Minds. MIT Press, Ch. 2,3 & 5.
• Buller, D. (2005). Evolutionary Psychology: the emperor’s new paradigm. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 277 – 283
• Buss, D. (1989). Sex differences in human mate preferences: Evolutionary hypotheses tested in 37 cultures. Brain and Behavioural Sciences, 12. 1 – 49.
• Carruthers, P. (2006). Simple heuristics meet massive modularity. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence and S. Stich (Eds.), The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition. Vol 2, pp, 181-198. Oxford University Press.
• Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer. Website – available at http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/primer.html
• Cowie, F., & Woodward, J. (2004). The mind is not (just) a system of modules shaped (just) by natural selection. In C. Hitchcock (Ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science (pp. 312 - 334). Blackwell.
• Currie, G., & Sterelny, K. (2000). How to think about the modularity of mind‐reading. The Philosophical Quarterly, 50, 145-160.
• Dupré, J. (2002). Humans and Other Animals. Oxford University Press. Ch. 9.
• Gangestad, S. & Simpson, J. (2000). The evolution of human mating. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 23, 573 – 587 (plus extensive peer commentary, would be useful if your essay is in this area).
• Laland, K. and Brown, G. (2011). Sense and Nonsense (2nd Ed). OUP. Chapters 5-7
• Machery, E. (forthcoming). Discovery and confirmation in evolutionary psychology. In J. Prinz (Ed.) The Oxford Handbook to Philosophy of Psychology.
• Pinker, S. (2005). So how does the mind work? Mind and Language, 20, pp.1 – 24
• Samuels, R. (1998). Evolutionary psychology and the massive modularity hypothesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 49, 575-602.
• Sterelny, K. (2006). Cognitive load and human decision, or, three ways of rolling the rock uphill. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence and S. Stich (Eds) The Innate Mind. Vol 2. 218-233. Oxford University Press.

Week 9: How does culture shape the mind?
• Henrich, J., Heine, S., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? Brain and Behavioural Science, 33, 61 – 83.
• Lillard, A. (1998). Ethnopsychologies: Cultural variations in theories of mind. Psychological Bulletin, 123. 3 – 32
Secondary:
• Astuti, R. (2001). Are we all natural dualists? A cognitive developmental approach. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 7, 429 – 447.
• Barrett, H. C. (2006). Modularity and design reincarnation. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, & S. Stich, (Eds.) The innate mind vol. 2: Culture and cognition. Pp. 199-217. Oxford University Press.
• Barrett, H., Broesch, T., Scott, R., He, Z., Baillargeon, R., Wu, D., et al. (2013). Early false-belief understanding in traditional non-Western societies. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 280, 1-5.
• Callaghen, T., Rochat, P., Lillard, A. et al. (2005). Synchrony in the onset of mental state reasoning. Psychological Science, 16, 378 – 384.
• Henrich, J., Heine, S.,& Norenzayan, A. (2010) The weirdest people in the world? Brain and Behavioural Science, 33, 61 – 83.
• Lillard, A. (1999). Developing a cultural theory of mind: The CIAO approach. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 8, 57-61
• Nisbett, R. (2003). The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently and Why. Nicolas Brealey Publishing.
• Nisbett, R., Peng, K., Choi, I., and Norenzayan, A. (2001). Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic versus Analytic Cognition. Psychological Review, 108, 291 – 310
• Norenzayan, A., & Heine, S. J. (2005). Psychological universals: What are they and how can we know? Psychological bulletin, 131(5), 763.
• Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2006). Toward a psychological science for a cultural species. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1(3), 251-269.
• Wellman, H. M., Fang, F., Liu, D., Zhu, L., & Liu, G. (2006). Scaling of theory-of-mind understandings in Chinese children. Psychological Science, 17, 1075-1081.

Week 10: Altruism in non-human animals
• De Waal, F. (2009). Primates and Philosophers. Princeton University Press. Electronic resource. Part 1, pp.1-58 (they are very small pages!) The commentaries at the end are useful secondary reading.
Secondary:
• Batson, C.D. (2011). Altruism in Humans. Oxford University Press
• Batson, C.D. (1991). The Altruism Question. Erlbaum
• Blackburn, S. (1998). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press. Ch.5
• Broad, C.D. (1930/1934). Five Types of Ethical Theory. K. Paul, Trench, Trubner. Ch.3.
• Butler, J. (1726). Sermon XI. Upon the love of our neighbour. Available through Project Guttenberg.
• Sterelney, K. & Griffiths, P. Sex and Death. University of Chicago Press. Ch.8
• Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Helping and co-operation at 14 months of age. Infancy , 11, 271 - 294.
• Warneken, F., Hare, B., Melis, A., Hanus, D., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Spontaneous altruism by chimpanzees and young children. PLoS Biology , 5, 1414

+ Philosophy of Science

Week 1: Philosophical Primer
• Duncan Pritchard, What Is This Thing Called Knowledge?, Ch. 1-3.
• E. L. Gettier, ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ Analysis, 23, 1963, 121-3.
• Jonathan Vogel, ‘Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation’, The Journal of Philosophy 87, 1990: 658-666.
• Jonathan Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, Ch. 1-3.
• Alvin I. Goldman, ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing’, Journal of Philosophy, 64, 1967: 357-372.

Week 2: Problem of Induction
• James Ladyman, Understanding Philosophy of Science, Ch. 2.
• David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, (many editions but see e.g. that edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, Oxford, Clarendon, 1975), Sections IV, VI, VII and X.
• Stephen Buckle, 'Marvels, Miracles, and Mundane Order', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79, 2001: 1-31.
• Gilbert Harman, ‘Enumerative Induction as Inference to the Best Explanation’, The Journal of Philosophy, 65(18), 1968: 529–522.
• Carl G. Hempel, ‘Studies in the Logic of Confirmation’, Mind, 54 (213), 1945: 1–26 and 54 (214), 1945: 97–121.
• Patrick Maher, ‘The Hole in the Ground of Induction’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74(3), 1996: 423–432.
• John Vickers, ‘The Problem of Induction’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/induction-problem/

Week 3: Falsification
• James Ladyman, Understanding Philosophy of Science, Ch. 3.
• Sir Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, (5th edition, 1989), Ch. 1 and 3.
• Sir Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, (1992 edition), Ch. 1, 3 and 4.
• Adolf Grünbaum, ‘Is the Method of Bold Conjectures and Attempted Refutations Justifiably the Method of Science?’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 27, 1976: 105–136.
• Secondary Reading
• Adolf Grünbaum, ‘Is Freudian psychoanalytic theory pseudoscientific by Karl Popper's criterion of demarcation?’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 16, 1979: 131–141.
• K. K. Lee, ‘Popper’s Falsifiability and Darwin’s Natural Selection’, Philosophy, 44, 1969: 291-302.
• Deborah G. Mayo, ‘Ducks, rabbits and normal science: Recasting the Kuhn's-eye view of Popper's demarcation of science’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 47, 1996: 271–290.

Week 4: Paradoxes of Confirmation
• Michael Strevens (2012), Notes on Bayesian Confirmation Theory, http://www.nyu.edu/classes/strevens/BCT/BCT.pdf# chapters 1-8
• Carl Hempel (1945), “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation (I)”, Mind 54, pp.1-26
• John Earman and Wesley Salmon (1992), “The confirmation of scientific hypotheses”, ch.2 in their Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Prentice Hall

Week 5: Bayesian Confirmation Theory
• Rudolf Carnap (1955), “Statistical and inductive probability”, reprinted in Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge 2010
• Patrick Maher (1996), “Subjective and Objective Confirmation”, Philosophy of Science 63, pp.149-174
• Branden Fitelson (2007): “Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and Relational Confirmation”, Synthese 156, pp.473-489

Week 6: Models and Modeling
• Weisberg, M. (2007) “Who is a Modeler?”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58 (2):207-233.
• Knuuttila, T. (2011) “Modeling and Representing: An Artefactual Approach to Model-Based Representation”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 42: 262-271.
• Godfrey-Smith, P. (2006) “The Strategy of Model-Based Science” Biology and Philosophy 21(5):725-740.
• Isaac, A. (2013) “Modeling without Representation” Synthese 190(16):3611-3623.
• Levins, R. (1966) “The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology” American Scientist 54(4): 421-431.
• Morrison, M., & Morgan, M. (eds.) (1999) Models as Mediators.
• Parker, W. (2011) “When Climate Models Agree: The Significance of Robust Model Predictions”, Philosophy of Science 78(4):579-600.
• Potochnik, A. (2012) “Feminist Implications of Model-Based Science”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43: 383-389.
• Weisberg, M. (2007) “Three Kinds of Idealization” Journal of Philosophy 104(12):639-659.
• Weisberg, M. (2013) Similarity and Simulation.
• Weisberg, Okasha, and Mäki (Eds) (2011) Biology and Philosophy 26(5) - special issue on Modeling in Biology and Economics

Week 7: Measurement
• Tal, E. (2013) “Old and New Problems in Philosophy of Measurement”, Philosophy Compass 8(12): 1159-1173.
• Morrison, M. (2009) “Models, Measurement and Computer Simulation: The Changing Face of Experimentation”, Philosophical Studies 143: 33-57.
• Chang, H. (2004) Inventing Temperature.
• Domotor, Z., & Batitsky, V. (2008) “The Analytic Versus Representational Theory of Measurement: A Philosophy of Science Perspective” Measurement Science Review 8 (6):129-146.
• van Fraassen, B. (2012) “Modeling and Measurement: The Criterion of Empirical Grounding”, Philosophy of Science 79 (5):773-784.
• Helmholtz, H. (1887) Counting and Measuring.
• Mari, L. (2005) “The Problem of Foundations of Measurement”, Measurement 38 (4):259-266.
• Tal, E. (2012) The Epistemology of Measurement: A Model-Based Account. Dissertation, University of Toronto.
• Tal, E. (forthcoming) “Making Time: A Study in the Epistemology of Measurement” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
• Teller, P. (2013) “The Concept of Measurement-Precision” Synthese 190 (2):189-202.

Week 8: Explanation
• Lipton, P. (2001). ‘What Good is an Explanation?’, in G. Hon & S. Rackover (eds.), Explanation: Theoretical Approaches, Kluwer, 2001, 43-59. Reprinted in J. Cornwell (ed.) Understanding Explanation, Oxford University Press, 2004, 1-22.
• Hempel, C. “Two basic types of scientific explanation” in Curd and Cover , pp. 685-94.
• Hempel, C. “The thesis of structural identity” in Curd and Cover pp. 695-705.
• Hempel, C. “Inductive-statistical explanation” in Curd and Cover pp. 706-16.
• Lipton, P. (1991/2004). Inference to the Best Explanation. (2nd Ed). (Chapter 8) Routledge.
• Lipton, P. (2000). Inference to the best explanation. In W.H. Newton (Ed). A Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Blackwell. 184 – 193. Available as an E-resource via the library website, and as a PDF on LEARN.
• Railton, P. “A deductive-nomological model of probabilistic explanation”, in Curd and Cover pp. 746-764.
• Lipton, P. (1990). “Contrastive Explanation”, in D. Knowles, (Ed.) Explanation and its Limits Cambridge University Press. Pp.247-66. Reprinted in D.H.Ruben (Ed.) Explanation. Oxford University Press, pp. 207 – 227.
• Psillos, S. (2002). Causation and Explanation. (Chapter 8.) Acumen.

Week 9: Explanation
• Godfrey-Smith, P. (1998). Functions: consensus without unity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 74, 196 – 208
• Ariew, R. Cummins & M. Perlman (Eds) (2002) Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. [Maybe not so new now but many useful essays in this volume] OUP.
• Buller, D. (1998). Etiological theories of function. Biology and Philosophy, 13 505 – 527.
• Cummins, R. (1975). Functional Analysis. Journal of Philosophy, 72 741 - 764
• Millikan, R. (1989). In defence of proper functions. Philosophy of Science, 56, 288 - 302
• Sober, E. (2000). Philosophy of Biology (2nd Ed.) Westview. Ch.3, sec.7
• Wright, L. (1973). Functions. Philosophical Review, 82, 139 – 168

Week 10: Realism and Anti-Realism
• James Ladyman, Understanding Philosophy of Science, Ch. 5.
• Anjan Chakravartty, ‘Scientific Realism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/scientific-realism/
• Peter Lipton, ‘Is the Best Good Enough?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 93, 1993: 89–104.
• Hilary Putnam, ‘Three Kinds of Scientific Realism’, Philosophical Quarterly, 32, 1982: 195–200.
• T. D. Lyons, ‘Explaining the Success of a Scientific Theory’, Philosophy of Science, 70, 2003: 891–901.
• J. J. C. Smart, 'Laws of Nature and Cosmic Coincidences', Philosophical Quarterly, 35, 1985, 272-80.

Week 11: Realism and Anti-Realism
• Bas van Fraassen, “Constructive Empiricism Now”, Philosophical Studies, 106, 2001: 151–170.
• Bas van Fraassen, ‘Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism’, The Scientific Image, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980): 6-21, 23-35 and 31-40; reprinted in Curd & Cover (edd.).
• James Ladyman, “What's Really Wrong With Constructive Empiricism? Van Fraassen and the Metaphysics of Modality”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 51, 2000: 837–856.
• Jeff Foss, ‘On Accepting van Fraassen’s Image of Science’, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 51, 1984: 79-92.
• Grover Maxwell, ‘The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities’, as in Curd & Cover (edd.).
• Alasdair Richmond, ‘Between Abduction and the Deep Blue Sea’, Philosophical Quarterly, 49, 1999, 86-91.

+ Epistemology

Week 1. The theory of knowledge, Gettier cases and skepticism
• Gettier, Edmund (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6):121-123. Online: http://philpapers.org/rec/GETIJT-4
• Weatherson, B. 2003. ‘What Good Are Counterexamples?’ Philosophical Studies 115, 1-31. Online: http://brian.weatherson.org/counterexamples.pdf
• Nagel, Jennifer ; San Juan, Valerie & Mar, Raymond A. (2013). Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs. Cognition 129: 652-661. Online: http://philpapers.org/rec/NAGLDO
• Pritchard, Duncan (2014). What is this thing called knowledge? Routledge: Chap. 3.

Week 2. Cartesian Skepticism
• Descartes, Rene (1641). The First Meditation from Meditations on First Philosophy. Klein, Peter. 2001: Skepticism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Online: http://plato.Stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/
• Brueckner, Anthony and Altscul, Jon (2010). Terms of Envatment. In Essays on Scepticism. Oxford University Press.
• Gerken, Mikkel. Critical notice of Brueckner’s Essays on Skepticism. In International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, Vol. 2, (1), pp. 65-77.
• Pritchard, Duncan (2014). What is this thing called knowledge? Routledge: Chap. 15.

Week 3. Agrippean Skepticism, coherentism and foundationalism
• Williams, Michael. 2001: Skepticism. The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (eds. Sosa and Kim), pp. 35-69. Online: http://www.blackwellreference.com/subscriber/uid=2748/tocnode?id=g9780631202912_chunk_g97806312029124
• Gerken, Mikkel (2012). Discursive justification and skepticism. Synthese 189, (2): 373-394. Online: http://philpapers.org/rec/GERDJA
• Vogt, Katja (2010). Ancient Skepticism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Online: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-ancient/
• Pritchard, Duncan (2014). What is this thing called knowledge? Chap. 4.

Week 4. Epistemic externalism (reliabilism)
• Goldman, Alvin I. (1979). What is Justified Belief? In Ernest Sosa & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Epistemology. An Anthology. Blackwell. 340-353.
• Keith Lehrer & Stewart Cohen (1983). Justification, truth, and coherence. Synthese 55 (2): 191 - 207. Online: http://philpapers.org/rec/LEHJTA
• Goldman, Alvin (2008). Reliabilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Online: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reliabilism/
Pritchard, Duncan (2014). What is this thing called knowledge? Chap. 6.

Week 5. Objections to and defenses of epistemic externalism (reliabilism)
• Graham, Peter J. (2012). Epistemic Entitlement. Noûs 46 (3):449-482. Online: http://philpapers.org/rec/GRAEE
• Tyler Burge (2003). Perceptual entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67 (3):503-548. Online: http://philpapers.org/rec/BURPE

Week 6. Contextualism
• Rysiew, Patrick (2009): Epistemic Contextualism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. Spring 2009 edn. Online: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contextualism-epistemology/
• Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the skeptical problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1): 1-52. Online: http://philpapers.org/rec/DERSTS

Week 7. Pragmatic criticism of contextualism I
• Rysiew, Patrick. (2001). The context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions. Noûs, 35 (4): 477–514. Online: http://philpapers.org/rec/RYSTCO
• Brown, Jessica (2006). Contextualism and warranted assertibility manoeuvres. Philosophical Studies 130 (3): 407 - 435. Online: http://philpapers.org/rec/BROCAW
• DeRose, Keith (2002). Assertion, knowledge, and context. Philosophical Review, 111, (2): 167-203. Online: http://philpapers.org/rec/DERAKA

Week 8. Criticism of contextualism II
• Nagel, Jennifer (2010). Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of thinking about error. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):286-306. Online: http://philpapers.org/rec/NAGKAA-2
• Kahneman, Daniel (2002): The Nobel Prize Lecture. Online: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2002/kahnemann-lecture.pdf

Week 9. Contrastivism
• Schaffer, Jonathan & Knobe, Joshua (2012). Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed. Noûs 46 (4):675-708. Online: http://philpapers.org/rec/SCHCKS-2

Week 10. Criticism of contrastivism
• Gerken, M. (2013). Epistemic Focal Bias. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):41-61. Online: http://philpapers.org/rec/GEREFB
• Gerken, Mikkel (2012). On the Cognitive Bases of Knowledge Ascriptions. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.
• Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn (forthcoming). Knowing the answer to a loaded question. Theoria.

Week 11. Review Contextualism, intuitions, x-phi, scepticism, Gettier and methodology.
• Nagel, Jennifer. Forthcoming. ‘Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Online: http://philpapers.org/archive/NAGIAE.1.pdf
• Brown, Jessica (2013). Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86 (2):233-261. Online: http://philpapers.org/rec/BROEPC.

+ Advanced Epistemology

Week 1:
• Fricker, Elizabeth (2008). Against Gullibility. Chap. 55 in Epistemology – An anthology, 2nd edition, (Eds. Sosa, Kim, Fantl & McGrath). Wiley Blackwell
• Gerken, Mikkel (2013). Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Week 2:
• Lackey, Jennifer (2006). Learning from words. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73(1):77–101.*
• Lackey, Jennifer (2011). Testimonial Knowledge. Ch 29, Routledge Companion to Epistemology (ed. Pritchard).

Week 3:
• Goldman, Alvin I. (2001). Experts: Which Ones Should You trust? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63, (1): 85-110.*
• Goldman, Alvin I. (1999). Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford University Press.

Week 4:
• Christensen, David (2007). Epistemology of disagreement: The good news. Philosophical Review 116(2): 187-217.*
• Christensen, David (2009). Disagreement as evidence: The epistemology of controversy. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.

Week 5:
• Jennifer Lackey (2010). A justificationist view of disagreement's epistemic significance. In A. Millar A. Haddock & D. Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. OUP: 145-154.
• Frances, Bryan (2011). Disagreement. Chap. 7 of Routledge Companion to Epistemology (ed. Prichard), Routledge.

Week 6:
• Goldman, Alvin. (2010). Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement. In Feldman and Warfield (eds.), Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
• Prichard, Chap. 8. of What is this thing called knowledge, 2nd Edition. Routledge.

Week 7:
• Maitra, Ishani (2010). The nature of epistemic injustice. Philosophical Books 51 (4):195-211.
• Fricker, Miranda (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press.

Week 8:
• Fricker, Miranda (2013). Epistemic justice as a condition of political freedom? Synthese 190 (7): 1317-1332.
• Wanderer, Jeremy (2012). Addressing Testimonial Injustice: Being Ignored and Being Rejected. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):148-169.

Week 9:
• Dotson, Kristie (2011). Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing. Hypatia 26 (2): 236-257.
• Sullivan, Shannon & Tuana, Nancy (eds.) (2007). Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. State University of New York Press

Week 10:
• Michaelian, Kourken (2008). Privileged standpoints/ reliable processes. Hypatia 23 (1):65-98.
• Rolin, Kristina (2006). The bias paradox in feminist standpoint epistemology. Episteme 3 (1-2): 125-136.
• Bowel, T. Feminist Standpoint Epistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://www.iep.utm.edu/fem-stan/

+ Basic Philosophical Methods

Week 1: Introduction to Conceptual Analysis and Thought Experiments
• Chris Daly, An Introduction to Philosophical Methods, Broadview Press, 2010. Chapter 2.
• Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Chapter 2.
• David Papineau, ‘The Poverty of Conceptual Analysis’, in Matthew Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, London: Routledge, 2013. 166-194.

Week 2: Functionalism, Inverted Qualia and Blockhead
• Ned Block (1978) ‘Troubles with functionalism’, in Timothy O’Connor and David Robb (eds.), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. Routledge, 2003. 222 – 233. Available as an e-book.
• David Chalmers. (date) ‘Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia’ in O’Connor and Robb (eds.) 234 - 254
• William Lycan, (1995) Consciousness. MIT Press. Ch.4. Available at: http://cognet.mit.edu/library/books/mitpress/0262620960/cache/chpt4.pdf
• David Lewis (date) ‘Reduction of Mind’, in O’Connor and Robb (eds.)197 – 209
• Hilary Putnam (date) ‘The Nature of Mental states’ in O’Connor and Robb (eds.) 210 – 221
• Robert Van Gulick (2009) ‘Functionalism’ in Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind Oxford University Press. 128 – 151. Available as an e-book.
• Sydney Shoemaker (1975) ‘Functionalism and Qualia’ Philosophical Studies, 27, 291 – 315
• Sydney Shoemaker (1982) ‘The Inverted Spectrum’ Journal of Philosophy, 79, 357 - 381

Week 3: Physicalism and zombies
• Todd Moody (1994) ‘Conversations with zombies’ Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1, 196 – 200 (read this first)
• Daniel Dennett (1995) ‘The unimagined preposterousness of zombies’ Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 322 - 326
• Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker (1999) “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism and the Explanatory Gap.” Philosophical Review, 108, 1 - 46
• Katalin Balog (1999) ‘Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind-Body problem. Philosophical Review, 108, 497 - 528
• David Chalmers (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press. ch.7.
• David Chalmers (2009) ‘The two-dimensional argument against materialism’. in Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind Oxford University Press. 313 – 338. Available as an e-book.

Week 4: JTB Analysis of Knowledge and Gettier Cases
• Gettier, Edmund (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6):121-123. Available online: http://philpapers.org/rec/GETIJT-4
• Goldman, Alvin I. (1967). A causal theory of knowing. Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.
• Pritchard, Duncan (2014). What is this thing called knowledge? Routledge: Chap. 4.
• Weatherson, B. 2003. ‘What Good Are Counterexamples?’ Philosophical Studies 115, 1-31.

Week 5: Reliabilism, Clairvoyance and the New Evil Demon
• Graham, Peter J. (2012). Epistemic Entitlement. Noûs 46 (3):449-482. Available online: http://philpapers.org/rec/GRAEE
• BonJour, Laurence (1980). Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge” Midwest Studies in Philosophy V: 53–73.
• Burge, Tyler (2003). Perceptual Entitlement” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67: 503–48.
• Goldman, Alvin (1979). What is Justified Belief” in G. Pappas, ed., Knowledge and Justification (Dordrecht: Reidel).
• Lehrer, Keith and Stewart Cohen (1983). Justification, Truth, and Coherence” Synthese 55: 191–207.

Week 6: Galileo’s Falling Bodies, Newton’s Bucket, and Einstein’s Elevator
• Norton, J. D. (1995) “Are Thought Experiments Just What You Thought?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26(3): 333–366.
• Clatterbuck, H. (2013) “The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: A Non-Eliminativist, Non-Platonic Account,” European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3(3): 309–329.

Week 7: Artificial Intelligence and the Chinese Room Argument
• Searle, J. R. (1980) “Minds, Brains and Programs,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3(3): 417–424.
• Plus these responses (also in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 3, 1980):
• Abelson, R. P. “Searle’s argument is just a set of Chinese symbols,” 424–5.
• Block, N. “What intuitions about homunculi don’t show,” 425–6.
• Dennett, D. “The milk of human intentionality,” 428–30.
• Hofstadter, D. R. “Reductionism and religion,” 433–4.
• Minsky, M. “Decentralized minds,” 439–40.
• Rorty, R. “Searle and the special powers of the brain,” 445–6.
• Turing, A. M. (1950) “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Mind 59(236): 433–460.
• Block, N. (1995) “The Mind as the Software of the Brain,” in Smith and Sternberg (eds.) An Invitation to Cognitive Science. MIT Press: 170–185. http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/msb.html

Week 8: The Open Question Argument and the Paradox of Analysis
• Moore, G. E. (1903) ‘The Subject Matter of Ethics’ in his Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Baldwin, T. (2010) ‘The Open Question Argument’ in The Routledge Companion to Ethics, John Skorupski (ed.), Oxford: Routledge
• Earl, D. (2007). A Semantic Resolution of the Paradox of Analysis. Acta Analytica 22 (3):189-205.
• Jackson, F. (1998) From Metaphysics to Ethics Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 6
• Mason Myers, C. (1971). Moore's Paradox of Analysis. Metaphilosophy 2 (4):295–308.
• Pigden, C. R. (2012). Identifying Goodness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):93 - 109.
• Wilfrid Sellars (1964). The Paradox of Analysis: A Neo-Fregean Approach. Analysis 24 (Sup-2): 84-98.
• Smith, M. (2013) ‘Moral Realism’ in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory 2nd ed. Hugh LaFollette and Ingmar Persson (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell

Week 9: Moral Twin Earth
• Hare, R. M. (1952) The Language of Morals (OUP) p148-50.
• Horgan, T. and Timmons, M. (1991) 'New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth' Journal of Philosophical Research 16
• David Copp (2000). Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth. Synthese 124 (1-2):113-137.
• Joshua Gert (2006). Problems for Moral Twin Earth Arguments. Synthese 150 (2):171 - 183.
• David Merli (2002). Return to Moral Twin Earth. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):207 - 240.
• Michael Rubin (2008). Sound Intuitions on Moral Twin Earth. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):307 - 327.
• Mark van Roojen (2006). Knowing Enough to Disagree: A New Response to the Moral Twin Earth Argument. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies In Metaethics, Volume 1. 161-94.

Week 10: Descriptivism about Proper Names
• Jesper Kallestrup, Semantic Externalism, London: Routledge, 2011. Chapter 1.
• David Braun, ‘Names and Natural Kind Terms’, in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Ernie LePore and Barry Smith (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, 490-515.
• Frank Jackson, ‘Reference and Description Revisited’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1998, 201-218.

Week 11: Kripke’s Epistemic, Semantic and Modal Arguments
• Jesper Kallestrup, Semantic Externalism, London: Routledge, 2011, Chapter 2.
• David Sosa, ‘Rigidity’, in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Ernie LePore and Barry Smith (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 476-489.

+ Advanced Philosophical Methods

Week 1: Reflective Equilibrium.
X Daniels, Norman (1980). On Some Methods of Ethics and Linguistics. Philosophical Studies: 21-36.
• “Reflective Equilibrium.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium/

Week 2: The Consequence Argument and “Begging the Question.”
• Kane, Robert (2005). “Chapter 3.” In A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. Oxford University Press.
• Fischer, John Martin & Pendergraft, Garrett (2013). Does the consequence argument beg the question? Philosophical Studies 166 (3):575-595.

Week 3: Kripke I – Externalism in language.
• Kripke, Saul (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.

Week 4. Kripke – The necessary a posteriori and rationalist methodology.
• Kripke, Saul (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
• Gerken, Mikkel (2015). Philosophical Insights and Modal Cognition. In Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism, (eds. Collins, J. and Fischer, E.), London, Routledge: 110-31.

Week 5: Twin Earth thought experiments: Putnam and Burge.
• Putnam, Hilary (1975). The meaning of 'meaning'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193. Online: http://philpapers.org/rec/PUTTMO
• Burge, Tyler 1982. Other Bodies. Chap. 4 In Foundations of Mind. Oxford University Press
• Burge, Tyler 1979. Individualism and the Mental. Chap 5. In Foundations of Mind. OUP.

Week 6: Experimental critique of semantic externalism.
• Machery, E., R. Mallon, S. Nichols and S. Stich. 2004. ‘Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style’, Cognition 92: B1–B12. Online: http://philpapers.org/rec/MACSCS
• Mallon, R., Machert, E., Nichols, S. and Stich, S. 2009. 'Against Arguments from Reference', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79, 332-356. Online: http://philpapers.org/rec/MALAAF-3

Week 7: Critique of the experimental critique of semantic externalism.
• Ishani Maitra, Brian Weatherson & Jonathan Ichikawa. ‘In Defense of a Kripkean Dogma’, forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Online: http://philpapers.org/rec/ICHIDO
• Devitt, M. 2011. ‘Experimental Semantics’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82: 418-435. Online: http://philpapers.org/rec/DEVES
• Machery, Edouard ; Mallon, Ron ; Nichols, Shaun & Stich, Stephen P. (2013). If Folk Intuitions Vary, Then What? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3): 618-635

Week 8: Skepticism about intuition.
• Weinberg, Jonathan M. (2007). How to challenge intuitions empirically without risking skepticism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):318–343.
• Brown, Jessica (2013). Intuitions, evidence and hopefulness. Synthese 190 (12): 2021-2046.
• Nagel, Jennifer (2007). Epistemic intuitions. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):792–819.

Week 9: Stability of intuitions.
• Swain, Stacey; Alexander, Joshua & Weinberg, Jonathan (2008). The instability of philosophical intuitions: Running hot and cold on truetemp. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1): 138-155.
• Wright, Jennifer Cole (2010). On intuitional stability: The clear, the strong, and the paradigmatic. Cognition 115 (3):491-503.

Week 10: Philosophical expertise?
• Nado, Jennifer (2014a). Philosophical expertise and scientific expertise. Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):1026-1044.
• Nado, Jennifer (2014b). Philosophical Expertise. Philosophy Compass 9 (9):631-641.